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CRIME AND THE JOB MARKET
ABSTRACT
This paper presents evidence on the relation among incarceration, crime, and the economic
incentives to crime, ranging from unemployment to income inequality. It makes three points:
1) The U.S. has incarcerated an extraordinarily high proportion of men of working age
overall, and among blacks. In 1993 the number incarcerated was 1.9 percent of the male work
force; among blacks, the number incarcerated was 8.8 percent of the work force.
2) The rising trend in incarceration should have reduced the rate of crime, through the
incapacitation of criminals and through the deterrent effect of potential arrest and imprisonment.
But administrative records show no such drop in crime and the victims survey shows a fall far
below what could be expected on the basis of incapacitation by itself.
3) The implication is that there was an increased propensity to commit crime among the
non4nstitutional population.
The paper focuses attention on the possibility that the continued high rate of crime in the
U.S., despite massive imprisonment of criminals may be one of the costs of the rising inequality
in the country, and in particular of the falling real earnings of the less educated. While we lack
a 'smoking gun" for such a relation, the preponderance of evidence suggests that economic
incentives have played a role in the increased propensity to commit crime.
Richard B. Freeman
Centre for Economic Performance




and NBERThe question that has traditionally motivated analyses of crime and the job market has
been the effect of unemployment on crime. Many people believe that joblessness is the key
determinant of crime, and have sought to establish a significant crime-unemployment trade-
off. Studies through the mid 1980s found that higher unemployment was associated with
greater occurence of crime, though the unemployment-crime link was statistically looser than
the link between measures of deterrence (such as the severity of criminal sentences or
chances of being caught) and crime, and was more closely aligned to property crimes than to
violent crimes.' Most important, although the rate of unemployment drifted upwards from
the 1950s to the 1990s, even the largest estimated effects of unemployment on crime suggest
that it contributed little to the rising trend in crime.
Developments in the 1980s-1990s raise a broader set of issues regarding the link
between the job market and crime.2 The high rate of crime in the 1980s despite increased
incarceration directs attention at potential increases in economic incentives to commit crime.
Perhaps the widely heralded increase in earnings inequality and the fall in the real earnings
of the less skilled men who commit most crimes gave young men a job market "push" into
See Freeman, 1983; Chirico, 1987.
2Economicsdoes not support the traditional focus on unemployment as the key labor
market variable affecting crime. Rather, it posits that the decision to commit crime depends
on the present value of economic returns to criminal activity compared to the present value of
economic returns to legal activity. The returns to crime depend on: the chance of success, the
money (utility) obtained from crime, less the value of the time spent at crime, the chance of
being caught and convicted, the length of sentence and resultant earnings lost due to
imprisonment. The crime decision should also depend on the effects of crime on future earnings
opportunities, and because crime is risky, on attitudes toward the risks involved in crime, which
range from risk of injury and death and arrest, conviction, and incarceration.
1crime. Perhaps the growth of the illegal drug business raised the returns to crime compared
to those from work. At the minimum, the massive incarceration of criminals in the 1980s
has brought the issue of crime from the periphery to the center of discussions of poverty and
the underclass.
Inthis chapter 1 examine evidence and studies regarding the effect of labor market
incentives on crime, the reverse effect of criminal activity on labor market outcomes, and the
financial payoff to crime. There are two bottom-line questions: 1) What part, if any, of the
high rate of criminal activity among young men results from the deteriorating job market for
less skilled workers? and 2) How does crime affect the long run economic position of those
who commit crimes? Before turning to these questions, I review the basic facts on the
criminal participation of young men and incarceration that makes crime important to
understanding the economics of the American "underclass".
TheFacts
In1993 the number of men incarcerated in the U.S. was 1.9 percent the number in
the labor force. The number of men on probation or parole relative to the male labor force
was approximately 4.7 percent,3 so that the number of men "under supervision of the
criminal justice system" was 6.6percentof the male work force --oneman incarcerated,
probated, or paroled for every twelve men in the work force. This was nearly as many men
as were unemployed in that year. At extant growth rates, the number under supervision will
exceed the number unemployed in 1994-95.
These figures are approximate because we do not have data for parole and probation for
1993, but must extrapolate 1990 figures.
2No. I have not made an error. These fIgures do not refer to young men or to
minority men. They refer to all men. For men aged 18-34, the ratio of those incarcerated
to the labor force was 3.1 percent; the number under supervision of the criminal justice
system was 11 percent of the work force in 1993. For all black men, the ratios to the work
force are 8.8 percent incarcerated, and 25.3 percent under supervision relative to the work
force. For black men aged 18-34. the ratios to the work force are 12.7 percent incarcerated
and 36.7 percent under supervision.4 Since a disproportionate number of prisoners are high
school dropouts, the proportion of less educated men, especially young men, who were
incarcerated, probated, or paroled, was even greater (Freeman. 1992).
High though these figures are, they understate the extent to which American men are
involved in criminal activity. Not evelyone who commits crimes is caught by the police.
and convicted of crime. The magnitude of involvement in crime is such that analysts who
once dismissed criminal behavior as a peripheral issue to employment or poverty can do so
no longer. No other advanced society has as large a proportion of its potentially productive
workforce involved in illegitimate activities, nor as large a proportion incarcerated.
trendS
The most striking trend in crime statistics in the 1980s was the growth of the prison
and jail population. From 1980 to 1991 the number of persons incarcerated rose at an
exponential rate, with no sign of deceleration (figure 1). The average annual increase in the
jail and prison population was 8.5 percent. Had nothing else changed, the imprisonment
These figures are larger than figures giving percentages of the various populations
incarcerated or under supervision since not all adult men axe in the work fox. I report figures
relative to the work force because my focus is on the links between crime and the labor market.
3trend should have greatly reduced the crime rate. It removed men with a high propensity to
commit crime from society; and increased the risk to potential criminals that they wouldend
up in jail or prison.
The standard administrative measure of crime, the Justice Department's Crime Index,
obtained from police departments around the country, does not show the expected drop in
crime. The Uniform Crime Rate (UCR), defined as the number of 'index' crimes per
100,000persons,5at best stabilised in the 1980s (figure 2). It fell from 1980 to 1984. then
increased through 1991 to approach its 1980 peak level before dropping modestly in 1992.
By contrast, the rate of criminal victimisations, defined as the number of times people report
they or their family were victims of crime on the azmual victiniisation survey, dropped over
the same period (figure 3), creating a problem of data inconsistency.
The victiniisation figures differ markedly from the UCR in level as well as trend.6
Because individuals do not report all crimes to the police, reported victimisations range from
2.4 to 4.1 times the police data on crimes. In 1973 32 percent of victimisations were
reported to the police. In 1991 38 percent of victimisations were reported to the police. A
large proportion of the difference in volume of crime between the administrative data and
victimisation survey is for crimes that are dlifficult to measure or report, such as rapes or
larceny.
The Uniform Crime Reporting Index is based on statistics that local law enforcement
agencies report to the FBI as part of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program. The crime index
is based on seven crime categories: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft, and arson.
6 Much of the discussion here is taken fromBoggess and Bound.
4Several factors explain the difference in trends between the two sets of data. Some of
the trend in the UCR is duetoan increase in the proportion of crimes that individuals report
to the police. Boggess and Bound estimate that increased reporting accounts for about one
quarter of the difference in trend. Perhaps another quarter of the difference in trend is the
increase in victhnless drug crimes, which individuals do not report. This still leaves a
sizeable difference in trend. Should one put greater weight on the administrative UCR data
or on the survey data on victimisation in assessing the trend in crime? One wayto judge
whichdata might be more accurate is to examine changes in crimes that are well-measured,
such as murder or automobile thefts. Murder rates roughly stabilised in the 1980s, rising for
teenagers while falling for adults. Auto thefts rose in the period. The change in these
crimes suggests that the stability in the UCR may give a better fix on what is happening to
crime levels than the falling rate in the victimisation survey.
increased propensity for crime
As noted earlier, the rough doubling in the prison and jail population in the 1980s
should, all else the same, have greatly reduced crime because of the incapacitation of
criminals. It produced, in addition, an upward trend in the proportion of crimes that resulted
in prison sentences (following a decline from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s) (Langan) that
should have further reduced crime through the deterrent effect. The different trends in the
UCR and victimisation rates notwithstanding, the 1980s levels of both statistics differ so
much from the levels that massive incarceration should have produced to tell the same story
about criminal behavior: namely that the propensity for crime among non-institutionalised
men increased immensely in the 1980s.
5Figure 4 demonstrates the increased propensity for crime in the UCR data. It plots
the annual relation between the proportion of the adult male population confined to prison or
jail and index crimes per man in the non-institutional population7. If the propensity for
crime in the noninstitutional male population were constant, the increased confinement would
reduce crime through incapacitation or deterrence, producing downward-sloping confinement-
crime (CC) curves. The greater the rate of criminal activity of those sent to jail or prison
and the greater the deterrent effect of jail or prison on future crimes, the more steeply sloped
will be the CC curve.
The curve joining the percent confined and crimes per man in the figure is not,
however, downward-sloping. It is a straight line, because the increased confinement of the
population in the 1980s was accompanied by a roughly constant number of crimes per adult
male. The three hypothetical CC curves in the figure show what should' have happened to
crimes per adult male rate as a result of increased incapacitation of criminals. These curves
take 1978 as a starting year and calculate hypothetical crime rates by subtracting from the
number of crimes in each succeeding year different estimates of the change in crime resulting
from the growth of the prison and jail population since 1978. The changes in crime are
obtained from conservative estimates of the number of crimes each additional confinee would
have committed had they been free;8 and ignore deterrent effects that should have begun
'Irelate crimes to the male population, because the vast bulk of arrestees, prisoners, and
persons who self-report crime are men.
8The numbers I use are much smaller than those in Zimring and Hawkins,p 95-96 or in
Wilson and Abrahamse, table 3.
6operating in the midllate 1980s and the changing age structure of the male population,9 both
of which would further add to the expected drop in crime. By construction, the hypothetical
CC curves slope downward.The gapbetween the actual and the hypothetical CC curves
measures the increased propensity for crime among the non-institutional male population
from the base 1978 year.
Figure 5 shows actual CC curves for reported victimizations committed per adult male
and hypothetical curves calculated in a similar manner to those in figure 4. The actual CC
has a negative slope, reflecting the drop in victimisations. In calculating hypothetical CCs in
this figure, I assume a greater number of crimes per person confined than I did in figure 4
because the volume of victimisations exceeds the volume of index crimes, though my
estimates are still moderate ones. The hypothetical CC curves show a much more
pronounced negative slope than the actual CC curve. The gap between the curves shows an
increased propensity for crime comparable to that in figure 4.
The bottom line is that the propensity o( the noninstitutional populationtocommit
crime rose sharply in the 1980s.
How might we explain this increase? The economist is naturally drawn to a job
market explanation. Given the well-documented growth of earnings inequality and fall in the
job opportunities for less skilled young men in this period, and the increased criminal
opportunities due to the growth of demand for drugs, the economist finds appealing the
notion that the increased propensity for crime is a rational response to increased job market
91n 1970 the proportion of the population that consisted of 15-34 year old men was 14.7%.
In 1980, the proportion had risen to 17.6%. But in 1990, it had fallen to 16.3%.
7incentives to commit crime. What is appealing, however, neednotbe true or. if true, may
be difficult to prove. To see how much weight we might reasonably give to an earnings
explanation of the rising crime propensity, I turn next to extant studies of the effect of
economic incentives on crime.
Labor Market Incentives and Crime: Statistical Studies
Social science analyses of the effect of the labor market on crime take several forms:
time series studies that compare the crime rate to labor market variables over time; cross-
area studies that compare crime and economic characteristics across cities or states; and
individual studies that compare crime and economic characteristics across people. In
addition, there are longitudinal studies that follow the same area or individual over time, as
economic opportunities change, and studies based on social experiments, in which the
experimenter manipulates opportunities.
Studies of crime and the job market through the mid 1980s, which focused largely on
unemployment, have been reviewed and summarised in detail in Freeman (1983) and
Chiricos (1987). Building on those reviews for the earlier period, I concentrate here on
ensuing work, and the "trend" in research results. Rather than updating the scorecard of
findings, I direct attention to specific studies that are either particularly innovative or
convincing.
time seriesstudies
Time series data allow us to examine the effect of the business cycle on crime and to
answer the question of what might happen to crime levels if overall job prospects improved
or worsened on a short term basis. For this reason, analysts often use time series data to
8examine the effect of unemployment on crime. But time series analyses suffer from a
myriad of problems that make many social scientists lear)' of their results. Variables tend to
move together over time, providing little independent variation from which to infer relations,
and often suffer from a tendency for the unexplained part of the dependent variable to be
oorrelated from one year to the next. All too often, addition of further observations, of
another explanatory variable, or choice of statistical technique, substantively changes results.
Time series studies through the mid-1980s showed that the overall crime rate and the
rates of particular crimes, such as burglary, were positively related to unemployment. But
the estimated effect of unemployment was moderate and, as noted, incapable of explaining
much of the upward trend in crime. Figure 6 shows a modest positive relation between the
number of index crimes per adult male and unemployment in each year from 1948 to 1992.
dominated by the upward trend in crime, so that any given unemployment rate is associated
with very different crime rates over time. A linear regression of the crime rate per 100,000
inthe population on a trend and the rate of unemployment gives a positive coefficient on the
unemployment rate with a moderate standard error. But the same regression with the crime
rate per 100,000 adult men as in the figure (rather than per the entire population) gives a
statistically insignificant positive coefficient on the unemployment rate.
Higher-tech statistical models -inwhich the change in a crime rate is regressed on
the change in unemployment and the change in unemployment one year earlier -tella more
complex story about the relation between crime and unemployment. Calculations for the
U.K. show that changes in the unemployment rate are associated with changes in crime in
the same direction, consistent with the notion that unemployment raises crime;, while
9changes in unemployment a year earlier have essentially no effect on crime (Hale and
Sabbagh). But calculations for the U.S. show that changes in unemployment this year are
associated with changes in crime in the opposite direction —anincrease in unemployment
reduces crime! —whilethe past years' change in the unemployment rate has the more
plausible effect of changing crime in the same direction (Cantor. Land and Russell).
Analysts have interpreted the negative relation between changes in current unemployment and
crime as reflecting a reduction in criminal opportunities in a sluggish economy (when
unemployment is high, there may be less to burgle and more people home watching their
properly) while interpreting the positive effect between changes in last years' unemployment
and crime as reflecting the increase in criminal motivation due to joblessness. The net of the
two effects varies by crime, is close to zero in several calculations, but shows that higher
unemployment is associated with reductions in motor vehicle thefts.
The time series results are, however, sensitive to the model and time period covered.
Using a model with several explanatory variables over the period 1933-1985 Cappel and
Sykes report a positive effect of contemporaneous unemployment rates on crime rates for the
U.S. As a check on the robustness of the time series relationss, I regressed changes in
burglary rates on changes in unemployment rates and changes in unemployment rates in the
previous year from 1948 to 1993. I obtained a negative coefficient on the contemporaneous
change in unemployment and a positive coefficient on the previous years' change, mimicking
Cantor, Land, and Russell. However, the coefficient on the contemporaneous change in
unemployment was insignificant, while the coefficient on the lagged change in unemployment
was large and significant, implying that higher rates of unemployment are positively
10associated with crime.
All in all. I would not weigh heavily the time series evidence. The same problems
that plague time series analyses of wages, interest rates, and unemployment plague time
series analyses of crime. Differences in years covered or in the model chosen or in the
particular measures used affect results substantively.The safestconclusion is that the time
series are not a robust way to determine the job market/crime link. For more reliable results
of how economic incentives may affect crime, I turn to evidence across areas and
individuals.
cross-section area studies
Studies of crime and the job market that use cross-section area data compare crime
rates in areas with greater or lesser.jobless problems or where the earnings of crime-prone
groups or income inequality are particularly low or high. These studies are free from
collinearity or serial correlation. But they suffer from their own set of inference problems.
Areas may differ in labor market conditions and crime for reasons having to do with the
features of the population that are not measured, producing spurious correlations or hiding
true ones. In some 1960s cross-section studies, for instance, crime was inversely related to
the percentage of nonwhites in the area. At face value, this would imply that nonwhites are
less likely to be criminals than whites, or that areas of black concentration are subject to less
crime than areas of white concentration —bothof which fly in the face of individual data on
who commits crime, who are the victims of crime, and on the locus of crime among
neighborhoods in a city. Rapid changes in the characteristics of areas, for instance a sudden
boom or bust or change in demographic mix, may also give misleading inferences if crime
11(other dependent variables) changes more gradually.
Still, cross-area studies are a natural way to examine the effects on crime on
economic variables such as income inequality or rates of poverty, that are likely to
characterise the area for extended periods. At the minimum, these data can answer such
questions as: is crime higher inareaswith higher levels of income inequality or in areas with
higher rates of poverty?
The majority of cross-area studies show a link between labor market factors and
crime. In my 1983 review, I classified 4 of 15 cross-area studies as giving significant effects
for unemployment and an additional 7 as giving positive but"weak"results. Suznmarising
42 studies, including several for Canada or the U.K., Chiiicos reports coefficients on
unemployment that were positive insignificant in 51% of the cases and positive significant in
14% of cases in pre-1970s data and that were positive insignificant in 44% and positive
significant in 48% of the cases in 1970s data (Chiricos, table 3, results for all crimes).
Some of the cited studies use similar data (though processing it with different models), so
that the results are not truly "independent". Some studies have larger samples and more
precise estimates than others, so that simple counts of signs and significance of coefficients is
also not ideal. Still, even absent a definite mega-statistical analysis of these results, it is
clear that the cross area data support a positive unemployment-crime link.
Not all the work since those reviews has yielded statistically significant coefficients on
unemployment, but nothing has arisen to overturn their conclusion.10 As an examplar study
'°Theone contrary analysis that I have found is Trumbeli's study of unemployment and
crime across North Cina counties, where he obtained a negative coefficient on the
unemployment rate. But this does not mean that county data are inconsistent with more
12that extends the analysis to the 1980s, consider Lee's study of crime in 58 SMSAs from 1976
to 1989. He esthnated the effect of economic variables on a set of crime rates using three
statistical models: a cross section model that compares economic incentives and crime among
cities; a fixed effects model where city dummy variables eliminate unmeasured city effects;
and a model that allows for last periods' unemployment to affect this years' crime rate. All
three models gave a positive crime-unemployment link. In the cross-section analysis the
overall crime and most specific crimes were positively associated with unemployment. In the
fixed effects model the total crime rate, property crime rate, burglary, and motor vehicle
theft rates were positively related to unemployment, while murder, rape, and some other
crime rates were not positively related to unemployment. The models which explored
different time patterns of unemployment-crime effects confirmed the positive link between
the variables. The magnitude of the link is, however, modest: Lee estimates that a 1 point
increase in the unemployment rate raises property crimes by 1.1 to 1.4 percent. This
contrasts with a coefficient of variation in property crimes across SMSAs of roughly 30
percent.
Results with respect to other labor market variables are also supportive of the notion
that economic incentives affect crime rates. Some studies use the income of the population
in an area and the percentage of families in poverty to measure the potential gain and
opportunity cost of crime. Others include a Gini coefficent or other measure of inequality to
capture both the gain and opportunity costs in a single term.The reviews by Freeman
aggregate state or SMSA data: in an analysis of 120 counties in Kentucky, Howsen and Jarrell
obtain positive coefficients on percentage unemployed or not in the work force.
13(1983) or Chiricos show that variables measuring inequality/poverty across areas are
associated with differing crime rates across cities. Land, McCall and Cohen find that even
homicide rates tend to be higher in cities with greater inequality. In his analysis of 127
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in 1979 and 1969, Lee obtained a significant positive
relation between crime and inequality measured as the difference between the household
income of the 90th decile and the 10th decile divided by the median household income,
calculated from the Census of Populations for 1970 and 1980. His model included numerous
other controls, such as the percentage of an SMSA that was black, population density, and
region of the country. Figure 7 gives the scatter plot between property crimes and inequality
that underlies his work for 1979.
To what extent, if at all, can these cross-section findings explain the rising crime
participation among adult men? From 1979 to 1990 the ratio of the difference between the
90th decile and 10th decile of household incomes divided by the median in the U.S. rose by
about 12 percentage points. Given the magnitude of Lee's estimated relation between
crime and inequality, this change would have induced a 10 percent increase in the crime rate.
This goes part of the way to explaining why the UCR index did not fall, despite rising
incarcerations.
Buttwoaspects of Lee's analysis raise doubts about this inference. First, Lee finds
that most of the inequality effect operated through a link between crime and income at the
90th decile: crime was more responsive to the income of the upperpartsof the distribution
"Calculated from U.S. Department of Commerce, 1991, Current Population Reports,
Consumer Income, Series P-60, no 174, table B-2.
14than to income in the lower part of the distribution. This is troublesome because the rise of
inequality took the form largely of falling real income in the lower part of the distribution.
Second, he reports that changes in crime rates across the SMSAs from 1969 to 1979 were
unrelated to changes in income inequality. Perhaps the cross section pattern shown in figure
7 is due to omitted area characteristics, and thus disappears when the analysis treats changes
in variables. Alternatively, perhaps measures of changes in inequality among cities are
subject to such huge measurement error that we should discount the change over time results.
In sum, cross section evidence continues to support a positive link between
unemployment and crime and suggest that inequality may be an important contributor to
crime. But there is enough statistical frailty in extant estimates to leave an door open to
doubt about how helpful the cross section inequality results will be in explaining the rising
propensity to crime that characterised the 1980s.
individual comparisons
Studies that compare the economic circumstances of individuals who commit crimes
with those who do not commit crimes, or the criminal behavior of the same person in
different economic circumstances, potentially offer the best way to assess how the job market
affects crime. The main reason for this is that these studies focus on the people who are in
fact making the crime decision and their particular circumstances. Some studies use records
on arrests or on prisoners. Arrest or prisoner data accurately measure the characteristics of
arrestees or prisoners, but do not provide information on criminals who have not been caught
nor on the characteristics of non-criminals. Other studies use self-reported criminal activity
on household surveys. Survey data in which people self-report crime cover all criminal
15activity, whether the crime was solved or not, and includes people who did not commit
crime. But people may incorrectly self-report crime: black youths, in particular, understate
their criminal involvement (Hindelang, et. al)
The strongest evidence that economic incentives are important in determining the
crime rate comes from studies of individuals. At a descriptive level, these studies find that
criminals are disproportionately from the groups whose incomes and employment
opportunities have been low and falling: young less educated men, often with low scores on
the Armed Forces Qualifying test or other standard tests. The evidence also shows that those
who end up in jail or are arrested were more likely to be jobless or to have low incomes than
other groups. Two studies of the Philadelphia birth cohort of 1945 (Wolfgang, Figlio, and
Sellin, 1972) found positive relations between unemployment and crime: Tauchen, Witte, and
(3riesinger report that youths who were employed for a larger percentage of a year were less
likely to be arrested than those employed for a smaller percentage of a year; Thornberry and
Christenson report a substantial contemporaneous positive relation of unemployment and
crime. In the 1980 National Bureau of Economic Research survey of inner city black youth
30 percent of those who committed a crime held a job at the time of the survey compared to
46 percent of those who had not committed a crime (Freeman, 1987).
While this evidence makes it clear that the population of criminals overlaps with the
population at the bottom of the U.S. 's increasingly unequal income distribution, it does not
establish a causal link from the labor market to crime. The data may, after all, simply
reflect the fact that the criminal population consists of people who are unable to succeed, in
society because of "personal characteristics". That is, the cause of both the poor labor
16market record and criminal activity may be a third variable having to do with the specific
attributes of the individuals. If this were the case, improved labor market conditions would
have little or no effect on the criminal's life of crime, although we would always find poor
work records among criminals. Moreover, though it is hard to argue that wages have fallen
among low skilled workers because they engage in moie crime than in the past, criminals
may have higher joblessness than non-criminals because they rejected jobs in favor of
unemployment --astatus that enabled them to engage more readily in crime.
There are three ways in which researchers use information on individuals to sunnount
these problems and make plausible inferences about causality. One is to look at the same
person in different periods. Farrington, et al compared the timing of criminal activity among
young men in the United Kingdom. The question is whether these men were more likely to
commit a crime when they were unemployed or when they held a job. Consider, for
example, someone who is unemployed for six months and employed for six months in a year
and who commits four crimes. If the person commits all the crimes while unemployed, it is
reasonable to conclude that unemployment is associated with crime, not with some
unobserved personal characteristic of the individual. By contrast, if the person commits the
crimes as frequently when employed as when unemployed, we would reject the notion that
his unemployment caused the crime. Farrington et al fmds that crime rates are higher
during periods of unemployment than during periods of employment. This does not "prove"
that the unemployment caused the crimes, but points in that direction.
A second way to link crime to economic incentives with data on individuals is to
examine the relation of the individual's criminal behavior to characteristics of the area in
17which theylive. The rate of unemployment or level of income in that area is presumably
independent of the characteristics of the individual, and thus a good indicator of outside labor
market incentives that might induce illegal activity. Analysis of the link between criminal
behavior and characteristics of the county in which a youth resides in the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth shows no relation between crime and unemployment and a
positive relation between crime and the income level in the county (Lee). Good, Pirog-Good
and Sickles fmd an insignificant negative relation between the monthly area unemployment
rate and crime in a sample of 300 youths enrolled in a Youth Service Center in Philadelphia.
Trumbull finds a negative coefficient on area unemployment in a sample of 2200 ex-
offenders from North Carolina. These findings conflict with the results from the area
studies, which fmd a positive relation between area crime and area unemployment. No one
has explored the reason for this divergence in results.
The third way to use individual data to infer causal links between economic factors
and crime is to estimate labor supply relations between criminal participation and actual or
predicted wages and criminal wages or perceptions of the attractiveness of crime. This form
of analysis is infrequent because most data sets do not contain infonnation on criminal
behavior or perceptions of returns or risks. An exception is the 1980 National Bureau of
Economic Research Inner City Youth Survey that included a special crime module designed
to allow researchers to probe the economic model of criminal behavior (Freeman and
Holzer). Viscusi used these data to estimate the effects of personal objective factors and of
perceptions of the return to cxme on participation. He found that youths who believed that
they "make more on the street than on a legitimate job" were far more likely to engage in
18crime than others and that estimated difference in income from crime and from legitimate
work also significantly affected crime behavior. His study does not "prove" that these
economic factors motivated crime. Perhaps those who commit crime feel it necessaxy to
justify such by reporting that crime was lucrative. Still, this evidence support that
interpretation.
In a similar vein, Grogger (1994b) estimated the effect of "potential" wages on
criminal participation in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. He obtained a
significant negative relation that implied that, roughly, a 10 percent decrease in the real
wages of youths would increase their crime rate by nearly 10 percent. Applying this
estimate to the observed drop in the real wages of young men, he predicts a 23 percent
increase in crime due to falling wages from the mid 1970s through the 1985-88. which he
notesisroughlyequaltothel8percentincreaseintheindexarzestrateforyoungmales
over that period. Grogger's estimates are imbedded in a highly structured economic model
and may very well be sensitive to alternative specifications, so I would not take them as
"truth" •butrather as another piece of imperfect individual level evidence on the role of
economic factors in crime behavior.
The Effect o( Labor Market Incentives on Crime: Ethnographic Studies
Ethnographic studies of crime provide qualitative information on the way individuals
view the opportunities and constraints in their local community and their perceptions of the
factors that underlie the choice of crime or work, or both. By viewing events through the
eyes of participants, ethnographic research can bring the decision to engage in crime "up
close and personal" and help us interpret statistical evidence.
19The findings of recent ethnographic studies on youth gangs and crime provide strong
support for a job market interpretation of the decision of young men to engage in crime.
Jeff Fagan, who directed a major multi-site ethnographic study of youth gangs reports that
"Gangs in South Central Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit changed in recent years from
ethnic enterprises organized around turf, ethnicity, conflict, and natural group processes to
business organisations with monetary and material goals. Money became the driving force
and organizational principal for these groups ...(This)almost ideological emphasis on money
(by gangs) ...(is)a dramatic shift from the gangs of 10 and 25 years ago" (Fagan, 1992a, pp
23. 25-26).
Below I summarise some of the conclusions from specific ethnographic studies that
back up Fagan's conclusion about the economic factors in gang and crime activity:
"All ...agreedmoney was the primary focal point within their gangs. Virtually all
criminal activities are oriented toward this end.' (Vigil, J. and S. Yun, on Vietnamese
gangs. p 156). "A dominant ...istheir intense desire to obtain money for themselves."
(Vigil, J.D., S. Yun, and J.S. Long, p 49).
"The 'gang as a business' albeit its illegal status, is a fact of life for many inner-city
youths throughout America today. More and more young men are turning to the gang to
make a living" (Padilla, F., Puerto Rican gangs in Chicago)
"Gangs moved beyond the scavenger stage ...(tobecome) corporate gangs. "(Taylor,
on black gangs in Detroit, Taylor. C.S. p 112)
"kids ...aredrawn to the underground economy because of the opportunities that
exist there. They know the work is hard and dangerous; there is no such thing as a quick
dollar" (Williams, T. p 132)
"making money is their main motive" (Chin, K.L. on Chinese gangs in N.Y., p 137)
"Those who had joined a gang most often gave as their reason the belief that it would
provide them with an environment that would increase their chances of securing money."
(Jankowski, A. p 60).
20The conclusion that gangs survive and grow because of the financial rewards they
gain for their members suggests that the resurgence of gangs is due largely to their potential
to cash in on new illicit opportunities)2 Ethnographers also report that many crime-prone
youths disdain the types of low wage work available to them: "simply wanting to work may
not be enough, it is the type of work and wage they axe willing to accept" (Quicker, et al p
4, 19), which is consistent with the economists' reservation wage/job mismatch story of inner
city joblessness (Hoizer).
Taken together, the statistical and ethnographic evidence present a consistent story
that supports the notion that crime responds to economic incentives.
The Effect o( Crime on Labor Market Outcomes
As the number of men incarcerated or involved in crime has risen, attention has
shifted from the effect of the labor market on crime to the reverse link —theeffect of crime
on labor market outcomes. How does crime affect current employment and earnings? How
does it affect future employment and earnings?
Data on work and crime activity by individuals in the same period provides a way to
answer the first question. As summarised earlier, the general finding in studies of
individuals is that crime and joblessness go together.It is easy, however, to exaggerate the
strength of the relation. Many people commit crimes while employed. In the NLSY the
difference in the employment rate of young men who admit to committing crimes (but were
12Whilemost ethnographies conclude that monetary incentives underly gang activity, there
is a general concensus that Chicano gangs are more twf-motivated (Moore; Jankowski; Vigil)
and Jankowski also reports that Irish gangs in Boston are also moreturf than crime business
oriented, due in part because of connections with adults in the world of work that are missing
in other communities.
21not arrested or convicted or sent to jad) and those who did not so admit is rather low. In
1979-80, 59 percent of those who were out of school and unemployed said they committed a
crime, compared to 53 percent of those out of school and employed.'3 Tabulating the data
the other way, of those who admitted committing crimes, 72 percent had a job compared to
76 percent of out of school young men who did not have a job. Many young men hold jobs
for short spells, and may move back and forth between legitimate and illegitimate earnings
activities, as well as making money from crime and legitimate work at the same time. The
big difference in employment rates between those who commit crimes and those who do not
is found for young men who later go to jail for their crimes.
To determine which way the relation between crime and employment actually runs,
Thornberry and Christenson estimated structural path models in which they sought to identify
both the crime —>unemploymentand the unemployment —>crimelinks. They found
evidence for both. While this is a plausible fmding, I am leary of reading much into it.
Absent knowledge of what in fact influenced the individual's decision, which the data do not
provide, any division of the relation between the variables is likely to depend critically on the
particular structural model used to make the estimates.
Interpreting the causal link between criminal activity in one year and future labor
market outcomes is much easier. Since the criminal activity precedes the outcomes, it is
difficult to argue that this reflects the influence of job market opportunities on crime. It is
easy, by contrast, to interpret any relation as reflecting the effect of crime today on future
crime question is on the 1980 swvey and refers to past crimes. We do not know the
exact timing of the crime. I compare it to the employment status in 1979, but results are similar
If I assume the crime was committed in 1980.
22employment or earnings performance. Many employers eschew hiring persons with a
criminal record (Finn and Fontaine). Some jobs legally exclude ex-offenders (Dale). On the
supply side, individuals engaged in crime today are likely to build up criminal skills at the
expense of legitimate skills, so that todays' crime will alter the relative rewards fmm legal
and illegal activity in the future.
In any case, studies of the effect of criminal activity on future job market outcomes in
longitudinal survey data give clear results. Persons whose criminal behavior leads them into
prison have markedly lower employment rates in the future than those who do not commit
crimes or those whose offenses are more modest (Freeman. 1992. Hagan and Palloni,
Sampson and Laub, Ferguson). My estimates show that a prison record has a substantial
quantitative adverse effect on future employment: in the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth a young man incarcerated in 1979 worked about 25 percent less in the ensuing eight
years than a young man who had not gone to prison. In 1987. for example, respondents
averaged 44 weeks of work over the year. whereas those who had been incarcerated in 1979
averaged 32 weeks of work. Part of this is due to the greater likelihood these youths were in
jail during some of the ensuing years. Sampson and Laub estimate a model that indicates
that the effect of jail on job stability underlies much of recidivism. In the 1980 National
Bureau of Economic Research survey I found that the monthly employment record of an
individual deteriorates relative to that of others after a spell of prison.
By contrast, other involvement with the criminal justice system has much less, if any,
longterm deleterious effect on employment. Grogger (1994a) reports only short term effects
of arrests on future employment using data for California. In the NLSY and two other data
23sets I found that anything short of probation has no discernible effects on future employment
of youths (Freeman 1992). Sampson and Laub interpret the strong effect of incarceration but
not of committing crimes per se on future employment as supporting a developmental model
of criminal activity. They suggest that a labelling theozy in which individual behavior is
affected by their social label may help explain this result.
The effect of imprisonment on future employment can be decomposed into two
separable effects. The first is recidivism: persons who are incarcerated have a high recividist
rate and thus will be absent from the job market in many future years. The Department of
Justice's 1983 follow-up of prisoners released in 1983 found that 63 percent were arrested
within three years of their release and that 41 percent were reincarcerated. In a longitudinal
sample that follows Georgia prison releasees for 17 years. Needels finds that 61 percent were
reincarcerated, and that the releasees averaged 15 percent of ensuing years in prison and
nearly 30 percent of ensuing years under supervision of the criminal justice system. The
second effect is that when they are out of prison, ex-offenders work much less than
"otherwise comparable" men.
Earnings from Crime
The reader will undoubtedly have noticed one missing element in my review of the
statistical studies of the effect of economic factors on crime. Conceptually, the crime
decision depends on how the earnings to crime (adjusted for the various risks of crime)
compare to the earnings from legal activity. But most studies report estimates criminal
behavior of unemployment, earnings inequality, or predicted earnings rather than on the
earnings from crime. Hamlet without the Prince, as it were.
24The main reason is that few surveys ask about criminal earnings and those that do
may not obtain accurate estimates. Criminals are generally "self-employed" --agroup for
whom it is difficult to obtain good data on earnings for legal activities. One must distinguish
between gross and net earnings; and must determine the time the self-employed actually work
to obtain an average wage rate comparable to wage rates in the job market. In contrast to
workers paid a fixed wage per hour (or month) the self-employed are likely to have their
hourly pay vary with the amount of time they work. Commit one burglary when you see a
good chance and you do well per hour. Commit lots of burglaries and you are likely to
move down the marginal returns curve, reducing average earnings.
To the extent that criminal earnings and legitimate earnings are positively correlated.
the lack of a good measure of illegal earnings will bias downward the estimated effects of
job market factors on criminal behavior. The reason for this is that measures of legal
opportunities will pick up both their posited negative effect on crime and the positive effect
of correlated illegal opportunities.
Not surprisingly, given the data problem, there is disagreement over how much men
make from crime and thus on the net payoff to criminal activity. In Freeman (1992), I
reported estimates of earnings from crime from several surveys. The 1989 Boston Youth
Survey showed a sharply falling hourly earnings with numbers of crimes and relatively
modest annual earnings of $3,008 for 16-24 year oids who report crime income. The 1980
National Bureau of Research survey also showed nodest annual earnings from crime
(Viscusi). A 1990 survey of seven drug runners in Oakland estimated that hourly pay was
$7.92. My conclusion from these scattered figures is that the hourly earnings exceeds the
25hourly earnings the youths could make in legitimate work (which is consistent with the
youthsassessment,as well, on the Boston Youth Survey that asked if they can make more on
the street or inlegitimatework).Atthe same time, annual earnings from crime aremodest.
possibly because the marginal earnings fall sharply.
For adult criminals, my calculations for prisoners in the 1986 Justice Department
Inmate Survey who said all of their income came from crime was that they earned $24,775
per year. Reuter reports that drug dealers earned $2,000 a month net in his sample for
Washington D.C., which he transformed into a $30.00 hourly rate of pay. Using the Rand
Inmate survey on numbers of crimes and various estimates of how much those crimes could
garner, Wilson andAbrahamnseestimated that criminal earnings for burglary/theft, robbery,
swindling are modest, below the earnings these crimina1 could make at work, and find that
only auto theft is potentially profitable. They also report that criminais estimated their take
from crime to be much higher than those crimes could plausibly have yielded, raising serious
doubts about self-reported incomes from crime.
All told, the quality of data on criminal earnings is too weak for any strong claims
about the longterm economic payoff to crime.
Conclusion
As the proportion of American men engaged in crime and incarcerated for criminal
activity has risen, it has become increasingly important to understand the causes and
consequences of criminal activity in addressing poverty as well as crime problems. While
extant research leaves open many important questions, it has shown several important things
about the link between the job market and crime:
261) In the l9SOs-early 1990s the U.S. developed a large, relatively permanentgroupof
young male offenders and ex-offenders, who for the most part are unlikely to be productive
members of the work force in the forseeable future.
2) There is a general positive relation between joblessness and crime, that appeaz
most strongly in comparisons of unemployment rates and crime rates across areas.
3) Labor market incentives beyond joblessness —thewages from legitimate work or
measures of inequality —affectcrime and potentially contributed to the rising propensity of
non-institutionalised men to commit crime in the 1980s.
4) Incarceration reduces an individual's economic outcomes over the long run. This
implies that the costs to an individual of crime exceed the opportunity cost of devoting less
time to legitimate activity today.
Although research has not yielded sufficiently strong results to predict reliably how
much crime might fall if the job market for crime-prone groups improved substantively, the
limited estimates we have are consistent with such effects being non-negligible.
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FIGURE 7: PROPERTY CRIME VS. INCOME INEQUALITY
127 METROPOLITAN AREAS IN THE U.S., 1979
SOURCE:
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